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Abstract—The way in which addressing and forwarding are
implemented in the Internet constitutes one of its biggest privacy
and security challenges. The fact that source addresses in Internet
datagrams cannot be trusted makes the IP Internet inherently
vulnerable to DoS and DDoS attacks. The Internet forwarding
plane is open to attacks to the privacy of datagram sources, be-
cause source addresses in Internet datagrams have global scope.
The fact an Internet datagrams are forwarded based solely on the
destination addresses stated in datagram headers and the next
hops stored in the forwarding information bases (FIB) of relaying
routers allows Internet datagrams to traverse loops, which wastes
resources and leaves the Internet open to further attacks. We
introduce PEAR (Provenance Enforcement through Addressing
and Routing), a new approach for addressing and forwarding
of Internet datagrams that enables anonymous forwarding of
Internet datagrams, eliminates many of the existing DDoS attacks
on the IP Internet, and prevents Internet datagrams from looping,
even in the presence of routing-table loops.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the biggest challenges facing the future of the
Internet is that its vulnerabilities to DoS and DDoS attacks are
inherent in the algorithms used in the Internet to: (a) assign
addresses to hosts, routers, and devices; (b) include source
addresses in Internet datagrams; (c) map addresses to routes;
(d) bind names to locations in the Internet; and (e) forward
Internet datagrams.
In theory, the goal of assigning Internet Protocol (IP) ad-
dresses to entities and including the source and destination IP
address in each datagram is to have system-friendly identifiers
that: state the origin and destination of Internet datagrams
based on topological locations where content, services, or
devices are made available; and can be matched efficiently
against stored information by routers and end systems. How-
ever, an IP address simply denotes the point of attachment
of a host or router to a network with a given IP address
range, without any topological information other than the
aggregation of IP addresses. Furthermore, IP addresses are
assigned to entities independently of the establishment of
routes to services, content, devices, groups, or any entity in
general. As a result, routing protocols (e.g., OSPF, BGP) and
directory services (e.g., DNS) map names used to denote
entities (e.g., domain names) to names that denote points of
attachment to networks (IP addresses). In addition to this,
the Internet surrenders any control of the allocation of source
IP addresses to Internet datagrams, because the origin of an
Internet datagram specifies the source address of the datagram
independently of any forwarding mechanism and end nodes
are allowed to specify IP source addresses.
Because of the algorithms used to assign IP addresses to
entities and write source addresses into Internet datagrams,
the source address of an Internet datagram fails to convey
its provenance correctly. The recipient of an Internet data-
gram is unable to authenticate the claimed IP address of the
source of the datagram based solely on the basic operation
of the forwarding plane of the IP Internet. The receivers of
Internet datagrams are forced to use additional mechanisms
and information to cope with the fact that a source address
need not denote the valid provenance of an Internet datagram.
Furthermore, these mechanisms are far more complex than
the simple mechanism used by sources of Internet datagrams
to state the origins of datagrams. In addition, IP addresses
are globally unique and assigned on a long-term basis, which
makes it easier for attackers to plan and mount attacks. This
constitutes a major vulnerability to DDoS attacks in the current
Internet architecture.
In addition to the above, a router forwards an Internet
datagram to its next hop based solely on the destination
address stated in the datagram and the next hop listed in
its forwarding information base (FIB). This is a problem in
the presence of routing-table loops, because it is possible for
Internet datagrams to traverse loops. The only approach used
today is to include a time-to-live (TTL) field in the datagram
header that is decremented at each hop of the path traversed
by the datagram, and to drop an Internet datagram after the
TTL value reaches zero.
The contribution of this paper is to present a set of algo-
rithms that we call PEAR (Provenance Enforcement through
Addressing and Routing), and which prevent Internet data-
grams from traversing forwarding loops, makes the identity of
the origin of an Internet datagram anonymous to the rest of the
Internet, and enforces the provenance of an Internet datagram.
Section II summarizes current defenses against DDoS flood-
ing attacks. The main objective of this review of prior work is
to point out that defending against large DDoS flooding attacks
is virtually impossible without changing the basic algorithms
used for the allocation of addresses to Internet datagrams,
the mapping of addresses to routes and connections, and
the protection of information carried in Internet datagrams.
Currently, attackers spend far less energy and time mounting
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attacks than their targets spend defending against them.
Section III introduces a simple approach to ensure that
Internet datagrams never loop, even when routing tables con-
tain long-term or short-term routing-table loops. The approach
operates by having the FIB entry for an address prefix state
the next hop and the hop-count distance to the prefix, and
by using the TTL filed of a datagram to enforce an ordering
constraint ensuring that a router can forward a datagram only
to a next hop that is strictly closer to the intended destination.
Section IV introduces a receiver-initiated address allocation
algorithm, a simple address swapping function, and an on-
demand routing algorithm operating in the data plane, which
together ensure that the origins of Internet datagrams remain
anonymous to any routers processing the datagram, and that
anonymous sources of datagrams can receive traffic from
public destinations over the reverse paths traveled by their
anonymous datagrams.
II. CURRENT DEFENSES AGAINST DDOS ATTACKS
The methods used to launch DDoS attacks today consist
of: (a) sending malformed packets to the victims to confuse
protocols or applications; (b) disrupting the connectivity of
legitimate users by exhausting bandwidth, router processing
capacity, or network resources; and (c) disrupting services
to legitimate users by exhausting the resources of servers
(sockets, CPU, memory, or I/O bandwidth). We address DDoS
flooding attacks aimed at disrupting the connectivity and
services offered to legitimate users. Four types of defenses
against these attacks have been proposed to date [3], [12],
[26], [30], [37]: Attack prevention, which aims at stopping
attacks before they reach their targets; attack detection, which
attempts to identify the existence of attacks when they occur;
attack source identification, which tries to locate the source
of the attack independently of the information contained in
packets used in the attack; and attack reaction, which aims at
eliminating or minimizing the impact of attacks.
The attack prevention approaches proposed to date focus on
routers filtering IP datagrams with spoofed source IP addresses
(e.g., [5], [13], [18], [22], [25], [28]), or routers adding prove-
nance information to IP datagrams The limitations of existing
packet-filtering approaches are that: (a) existing filters provide
only coarse-grained descriptions of valid source IP addresses;
(b) filters are vulnerable to asymmetric routing and the dy-
namics of routing protocols; (c) it can be difficult to determine
which source IP addresses are valid because of the complexity
of the network topology; and (d) the exiting approaches used
to update filters either incur substantial signaling overhead or
are very slow to update filters with new data. Prior approaches
based on adding provenance information require too much
effort by the attacked network, because they involve the use
and dissemination of secret keys to mark IP datagrams, and
some even require additional headers.
Several defense approaches have focused on detecting spe-
cific DoS and DDoS attacks (e.g., [2], [7], [16], [29], [39]) or
anomaly detection (e.g., [10], [21], [40]). These approaches
monitor the behavior of specific protocols or the network
in an attempt to detect flow anomalies. The key limitation
of defense approaches based on detection is that they must
rely on a number of assumptions regarding the behavior of
legitimate users, and attackers can adopt countermeasures to
evade detection. Some DoS attacks can be detected, given that
only a few computer systems are attackers and compromised
system must behave differently than benign users to exhaust
the resources of their targets. However, the problem is far more
difficult for DDoS attacks, which involve many compromised
hosts that can mimic legitimate users and need not change the
normal pattern of protocol traffic to be effective.
Prior approaches for the identification of attack sources
have focused on tracing the origins of attacks by explicit
signaling or marking datagrams with the paths they traverse
(e.g., [9], [31], [33], [34], [35], [41], [42]). Some path mark-
ing techniques have also been combined with filtering. The
main limitations of these approaches include that: it may be
difficult to infer the attack paths in large DDoS attacks; some
approaches can consume considerable storage, processing, and
communication overhead; some path markings are not entirely
unique; and tracebacks and markings become useful only after
the attacks have consumed network resources and have reached
their targets. Similarly, prior approaches aimed at filtering
Internet datagrams with spoofed IP addresses are only partially
effective, because they change router behavior to enact filtering
without changing the way in which IP source addresses are
assigned to Internet datagrams [5], [13], [18], [22], [25], [28],
or the fact that datagram forwarding is independent of the
distances to address prefixes stated in routing tables.
Approaches that introduce additional information to denote
the provenance of a datagram are difficult to implement and
cannot be deployed at Internet scale, because they require
public key infrastructure (PKI) support. For example, HIP [27]
requires a PKI that is globally deployed to prevent attackers
from simply minting unlimited numbers of host identifiers
used in HIP. AIP [4] on the other hand assumes a flat
addressing space that cannot be applied at Internet scale, is
vulnerable to malicious hosts creating unlimited numbers of
EIDs, and does not offer an efficient way to recovering from
compromised private keys corresponding to the AIP addresses
of hosts or accountability domains. Similar limitations exist in
approaches that add path information (e.g., [8], [23]).
Attack-reaction approaches seek to minimize the damage
caused by attacks by protecting bottleneck resources [24]. The
mechanisms that have been proposed include reducing the state
needed to execute specific communication protocols (TCP in
particular [6], [11], [32]); manage resources, shape traffic,
and increase the capacity of servers [19], [36]; and secure
the communication between confirmed users and servers [20],
[38]. Attempting to reduce connection state in TCP is a good
objective in all TCP implementation modifications; however,
they have not caught on because of the inconsistencies they
introduce in the establishment and termination of connections.
Approaches that attempt to manage bottleneck resources are
not effective, because such resources are shared fairly by
DDoS traffic, leaving limited resources for valid users. On the
other hand, prior approaches that attempt to secure the commu-
nication between valid users and resources are overly complex,
because they build new mechanisms to enforce provenance and
obfuscation on top of existing Internet methods for naming,
addressing and routing.
III. ELIMINATING FORWARDING LOOPS IN THE INTERNET
The Internet datagram forwarding algorithm is based on FIB
entries that simply state the next hops for IP address prefixes.
To forward a datagram intended to destination address d, an IP
router looks up its FIB to obtain the best match for d among
the entries listed in its FIB for known IP address prefixes and
decrements the TTL of the datagram.
Two approaches are currently used to cope with the oc-
currence of forwarding loops in Internet forwarding. In the
forwarding plane, the time-to-live (TTL) field of an Internet
datagram is used to discard a datagram after it circulates a
forwarding loop too many times. In the control plane, routing
protocols (e.g., OSPF and EIGRP) are used to reduce or
eliminate the existence of routing loops. However, even if
a loop-free routing protocol is used in the control plane, a
datagram may still circulate a forwarding loop while routing
tables are inconsistent among routers.
We propose using FIBs to ensure that forwarding decisions
in the data plane are consistent with the routing information
maintained by the routing protocol operating in the control
plane. The FIB entry stored at router i for address prefix d∗
states the minimum-hop distance Hid∗ to the prefix in addition
to the next hop n to the prefix. We assume for convenience
that a distance stated in a FIB is a minimum-hop count to a
destination. We denote by P k[sk, d, T k, IDo](p) an Internet
datagram sent by router k with a header that contains a source
address of local scope (sk), a destination address of global
scope (d), a TTL value (T k), and an origin ID (IDo), plus
payload data p. Router i uses the following rule to forward
such a datagram using its FIB within a network.
TTL-based FIB Rule (TFR):
Router i accepts to forward P k[sk, d, T k, IDo](p) from router
k towards the best-match prefix d∗ for d if T k > Hid∗ .
If router i accepts P k[sk, d, T k, IDo](p), it sets T i = Hid∗
and forwards datagram P i[si, d, T i, IDo](p) to its next hop
towards prefix d∗. A router simply drops a datagram intended
for a destination address of global scope with a TTL value
that does not satisfy TFR. 
TFR consists of imposing an ordering constraint on the
traditional Internet datagram forwarding algorithm based on
FIB entries, and making the TTL value of the datagram equal
to the distance stored in the FIB for the intended destination,
rather than simply decrementing its value. The following
theorem proves that TFR eliminates IP forwarding loops.
Theorem 1: No Interest can traverse a forwarding loop in
an IP network in which TFR is used to forward datagrams.
Proof: Consider a network in which TFR is used and as-
sume for the sake of contradiction that routers in a forwarding
loop L of h hops {v1, v2, ..., vh, v1} forward a datagram for
destination d along L with no router in L detecting that the
datagram has traversed loop L.
Given that L exists by assumption, router vk ∈ L must
forward P vk [svk , d, T vk , IDo](p) to router vk+1 ∈ L for
1 ≤ k ≤ h − 1, and router vh ∈ L must forward
P vh [svh , d, T vh , IDo](p) to router v1 ∈ L.
According to TFR, if router vk (1 < k ≤ h) forwards
P vk [svk , d, T vk , IDo](p) to router vk+1 as a result of receiving
P vk−1 [svk−1 , d, T vk−1 , IDo](p) from router vk−1, then it must
be true that T vk−1 > Hvkd∗ , where d
∗ is the address prefix
that is the best match for destination d. Similarly, if router
v1 forwards P v1 [sv1 , d, T v1 , IDo](p) to router v2 as a result
of receiving P vh [svh , d, T vh , IDo](p) from router vh, then it
must be true that T vh > Hv1d∗ . However, these results constitute
a contradiction, because they imply that Hvkd∗ > H
vk
d∗ for
1 ≤ k ≤ h. Therefore, the theorem is true.
Theorem 1 is independent of whether the network is static or
dynamic, or whether routers use single-path routing of multi-
path routing. The ordering constraint of TFR is essentially the
same loop-free condition first introduced in DUAL [14]. The
difference between the way in which the ordering constraint
is used in TFR and in DUAL is that TFR establishes distance-
based ordering in the data plane to forward datagrams based on
existing FIB entries, while DUAL establishes distance-based
ordering in the control plane to build FIB entries that are then
used to determine how to forward datagrams.
As stated, TFR is only applicable within an autonomous
system (AS) in which the same routing protocol is used to
obtain minimum-hop distances to destinations. However, ap-
plying the approach used in TFR across autonomous systems is
relatively straightforward. A datagram needs to carry two hop
counts, one that states the AS hop count to the destination AS,
and another one stating the distance to the intended destination
within the same AS or the gateway connecting to the next AS
along the path to the destination AS.
IV. ANONYMOUS DATAGRAM FORWARDING
Since the introduction of datagram packet switching by
Baran [1], the identifiers used to denote the destinations and
sources of datagrams have had global scope. Today, the FIBs
maintained by Internet routers list entries that state the next
hop to each known IP address range of global scope.
However, five important observations can be made to argue
that datagram forwarding does not have to be limited to
Baran’s original design. First, the purpose of having addresses
in datagram headers is to enable hop-by-hop datagram for-
warding based on fast lookups of destination-based routing
tables, which does not require addresses to have global, long-
term meaning. Second, assigning IP addresses to hosts on a
long-term basis as if they were names is not necessary and
enables attackers to take advantage of the quasi-static nature
of such identifiers. Third, there is no technical reason for the
origin of an IP datagram to be the entity that assigns the source
IP address of the datagram. Fourth, having the destination
of an IP datagram ascertain the provenance of a datagram
without any assistance from the routing infrastructure imposes
too much effort on the destination and is done after datagrams
with spoofed addresses have wasted network resources. Fifth,
the packet-filtering schemes proposed to date to address DDoS
attacks do not take full advantage of the distance information
maintained in routing tables.
Our approach consists of using IP addresses of local
scope to denote anonymous sources of Internet datagrams,
and introducing an on-demand routing algorithm to maintain
routes to such addresses. Similar to the approach in [17],
we advocate Internet datagram forwarding over symmetric
paths in order to support the forwarding of Internet datagrams
using IP addresses with local scope. The rest of this section
describes the mechanisms for supporting anonymous datagram
forwarding in the Internet using a simple example. A formal
description of the algorithms is omitted for brevity.
A. Receiver-Initiated Source Address Assignment
Each router announces a continuous interval of IP addresses
(local interval) that the router considers valid local-scope
addresses used to denote sources or destinations of Internet
datagrams.
Router i maintains a local-interval set table (LIST i) that
lists the local interval announced by each neighbor router k
(LIi(k)) to router i, and the local interval announced by router
i to its neighbors (LIi(i)). All local intervals are of equal
length |LI|, and hence a local interval is uniquely defined by
the IP address at the start of the interval. The start of local
interval LIi(k) is denoted by LIi(k)[s]. Given this, router i
can easily map an IP address of local scope x ∈ LIi(i) to a
corresponding IP address of local scope y that is acceptable to
neighbor k with the following bijection, where  is a constant
known only to router i:
y ≡ + x− LIi(i)[s] + LIi(k)[s] mod |LI| (1)
B. Forwarding Information Stored and Exchanged
PEAR is transparent to end hosts. Clients and servers
simply use IP datagrams without modification. The addresses
specified in a datagram sent between a host and router may
be of local or global scope. A host that originates datagrams
must use an IP address taken from the local-interval set used
by the adjacent router.
To forward Internet datagrams from an anonymous data-
gram source to a destination with an IP address d that
has global scope, PEAR uses three addresses to forward a
datagram. A source IP address of local scope denotes the
originating router of the datagram at each hop of the path
towards the destination. An IP address of global scope denotes
the intended destination. In addition, an IP address of local
scope, which we call the origin ID, is used to denote the host
that originated the datagram.
The TTL filed of a datagram is used to enforce TFR at each
router to forward a datagram towards the best prefix match d∗
for destination address d of global scope. A router that receives
a datagram from a host sets the TTL field of the datagram to
equal its hop-count distance to the destination.
Because the source IP address and the origin ID stated in
a datagram have local scope, routers along the path from
an anonymous source to a destination with a global-scope
address must establish forwarding state pointing back towards
the anonymous source in order for datagrams from d to the
anonymous source to be forwarded. Additional forwarding
tables are needed to accomplish this.
Each router maintains a Hop-Specific Routing Table (HRT)
to keep track of the next hops towards destinations denoted
by addresses that have hop-specific scope. Router i maintains
HRT i, which is indexed using hop-specific IP addresses taken
from LIi(i). An entry in HRT i states a hop-specific IP
address (HIP) used to denote a destination (HIP (HRT i) ∈
LIi(i)), a next hop to that destination, (n(HRT i) ∈ N i), and
a hop-specific address mapping used to handle collisions of
hop-specific IP addresses (map(HRT i) ∈ LIi(i)).
HRT i[HIP, n,map] denotes a given entry in HRT i. A
HIP used as the source IP address in a datagram forwarded
by router i is denoted by SHIPD(i). Similarly, DHIPD(i)
and OHIPD(i) are used to denote the destination IP address
and the origin IP of a datagram forwarded by router i,
respectively.The origin IDs are not stored in HRT entries. Each
router uses the same bijection of Eq. (1) to map the origin ID
stated in a datagram it receives to the origin ID of the datagram
it forwards towards its destination.
Each router also maintains a Destination Routing Table
(DRT) to reduce the amount of forwarding state needed in
relaying routers. Router i maintains DRT i, which indexed
using origin IDs received in datagrams and lists entries cor-
responding to sources of datagrams that have indicated a
destination address that is directly attached to router i. An
entry in DRT i states an origin ID ((O(DRT i)) and a hop-
specific IP address ((HIP (DRT i)), both of which are in the
local interval defined for router i.
Fig. 1. Datagram forwarding using IP address swapping with PEAR
C. Forwarding of Datagrams from Anonymous Sources
Routers that forward a datagram from an anonymous source
to a destination address of global scope use their FIBs to
determine the next hop and establish forwarding state in their
HRTs as the datagram is forwarded to allow datagrams to flow
back to anonymous sources.
Figure 1 shows an example of the forwarding state estab-
lished at relay routers between an anonymous source and a
well-known destination to enable datagrams to be sent back
to IP addresses of local scope. The example in the figure shows
a client h initiating communication with a server assigned
an address d that has network-wide scope and is part of
an address prefix listed in the forwarding information bases
(FIB) maintained by routers. It is assumed that the client has
obtained the IP address of the intended destination d using
the DNS or other means. The IP address assigned to host h is
sp and has only local scope at router p, i.e., other routers do
not associate sp with the same host h. In the example, host h
must use IP address sp as its source address. Router p accepts
datagrams from host h only if the IP source address in those
datagrams is sp. The TTL field is not shown in the figure, but
TFR is assumed to be applied by each relay router.
Starting with the router that receives a datagram from an
attached host (router p in the example), routers establish
forwarding state using a source IP addresses of local scope,
an origin ID that is also an IP address of local scope, and
the destination address. In the figure, a datagram forwarded
between two routers towards the destination with global-scope
address d is denoted by P [x, d : sx], where x is a source IP
address of local scope, d is the global-scope address, and sx
is an origin ID. The source IP address and origin ID of a
datagram being forwarded by router r to router n along the
path from host h to address d (Phd) are taken from the local
interval assigned by n to r (LIr(n)) using the bijection stated
in Eq. (1).
In the example of Figure 1, router i has an exiting entry
HRT i[15, q, 15] when it receives datagram P [15, d : si] from
router p 6= q. The destination IP address in the datagram
has global scope and hence is forwarded based on its FIB.
However, the source IP address in the datagram received from
p collides with entry HRT i[15, q, 15]. Accordingly, router
i selects HIP = 40, which is not used in any existing
HRT entry; creates entry HRT i[40, p, 15], sets SHIPD(i) =
fi(n)[40] = 550 and OHIPD(i) = fi(n)[si] = sn; and
forwards datagram P [550, d : sn] to router n.
When router y receives P [1005, d : sy] from router n, it
determines that the host with address y is locally attached.
Accordingly, it creates an entry in DRT i with the tuple
(sy, 1005) and passes datagram D[sy, d] to the host with IP
address d.
D. Forwarding of Datagrams to Anonymous Sources
Routers use their HRTs to forward datagrams to destinations
denoted with hop-specific addresses. Given that TFR is used
when the entries in HRTs are established, the paths implied
by HRT entries are loop-free.
In Figure 1, when router i receives datagram P [d, 550 : si]
from router n, the fact that the destination address in the
datagram is in its local interval LIi(i) instructs router i to
use HRT i for forwarding rather than its FIBi. To do so,
router i computes the inverse function f−1i (n)[550] = 40.
Using HIP = 40 as the key in HRT i, router i obtains
the next hop p and sets DHIPD(i) = 15. Router i also
computes f−1i (n)[sn] = si, sets OHIP
D(i) = si, and
forwards forwards P [d, 15 : si] to router p. In turn, router p
uses f−1i (p) to obtain the values of the destination address and
origin ID for the datagram it should forward. However, given
that p = f−1i (p)[15] ∈ Lp(p), router p obtains the local host
that should receive the datagram. It computes f−1i (p)[si] = s
and forwards D[d, s] to the host with IP address s.
E. Enforcing Anonymity and Provenance of Datagrams
It is easy to show that PEAR enforces anonymity of
datagrams, in the sense that no intruder can determine the
origin of a datagram simply by monitoring traffic over a link
and reading the headers of datagrams. The reason an Internet
datagram divulges the identity of its source is that source
addresses have global scope and hence any relay router or
intruder receiving the datagram can determine its origin.
Reducing the scope of a source address to the specific hop
where the datagram is being forwarded still allows intruders
and relay routers to infer the identity of the source in small
networks. However, forcing each relay to use an address from
an address space provided by the next hop eliminates the
ability of an intruder or the receiving router to infer the true
identity of the datagram origin. This is the case even in small
networks larger than two routers, unless the topology of the
network is such that any traffic sent from a given router must
be originated by the router (e.g., a leaf router).
Even tough PEAR uses IP addresses of hop-specific scope
to provide anonymity, routers can enforce correct provenance
of datagrams by eliminating the ability of hosts or routers
to inject arbitrary source IP addresses in datagrams being
forwarded among trusted routers implementing PEAR.
An ingress router accepts a datagram from an attached host
only if it has a source address deemed valid for that host.
Furthermore, the source IP address and origin ID it uses in
the datagram it forwards to the next hop must both be in
the address space provided by the next-hop router, and the
same is true at every hop along the path to the destination.
Therefore, it follows that any malicious host or team of routers
attempting to inject datagrams with spoofed IP source ad-
dresses can be identified by the first trusted router that does not
receive datagrams with correct source addresses. Furthermore,
malicious datagrams using valid source addresses can be traced
back to the first untrusted router injecting the traffic, given
the inductive nature of the receiver-initiated source address
assignment and the simple bijection used at each hop to swap
IP addresses to and from anonymous destinations.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We introduced the first approach for Internet datagram
forwarding that eliminates forwarding loops even if routing
tables contain routing-table loops. Based on the ability to
eliminate forwarding loops, we also presented an approach that
enables the origins of Internet datagrams to remain anonymous
while enforcing the correct provenance of datagrams. As such,
the proposed forwarding scheme can be applied to eliminate
many of the existing DDoS attacks on the IP Internet, which
are enabled by the inability of Internet datagrams to enforce
correct provenance.
Additional work is needed to formally describe the specific
DDoS countermeasures enabled by PEAR. Equally important,
TFR can be applied to inter-domain routing by utilizing two
hop counts, one that takes effect across autonomous systems
and another one that is used within an autonomous system.
However, such cluster-based version of TFR has not been
proven to be correct as is the case of TFR [15], [14] and
this is an obvious next step.
Lastly, even though we have advocated symmetric paths as
additional protection against DDoS attacks [17], the Internet
has many asymmetric paths, and the proposed scheme must
be extrapolated to the case in which datagrams from s to d
follow a different path than datagrams from d to s.
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